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Jurisprudence "is a rational science,founded ipon universal
principles of moral rectitude but modified by habit and au-
thority. "---Lord Mansfield.
"Let us consider wherein the law consists and vwe shall
find it to be,not in particular instances and precedent,but
in the reason of the law."---Lord Holt.
Introduction.
Vaxims have always been considored a necessary part of the
law. It has been said byr some writers that they are of the
same force as acts of Parliamentwhen they have received ju-
dicial sanction. In order to receive this judicial sanction
it would seem that the maxim should pass through a certain
probationary stage of formation,as it were,and have proved its
merit and value.
T'axims abounded in the cor.ron law,but on account of
statutory modifications,changes in the mode of procedure and
a multiplication of the reported decisions,many of the maxims
have passed into disuse. Among those that are still intact
is this one under discussion: In jure non remota causa,sed
proxima,spectatur. It is the first of Lord Bacon's "IMaxims of
Law"
The origin of the maxim is uncertain. No trace of it
can be found in the ca. K ivil law. Bacon intimates that
some of the maxims in his work are orig-inal with him,and very
probably this is one of them. It has been suggested by some
authorities that Bacon drew the text of it from certain phil-
osophical discussions which v re in the hands of nearly all
thinking people at that time. This is doubtless the true
source from which the maxim was drawn.
When Bacon wrote the maxim several methods of investi-
gating truth were used by philyosophers,and it was Bacons
purpose to prove that these methods were erroneous. He declar-
ed that the true method was by a search for causes;that no
one questioned. He went still further and taught that the
proximate cause was to be searched out,and the remote causes
to be neglected. This mode of searching for truth has become
firmly established in legal jurisprudence.
The meaning of the maxim is explained by Bacon in the
following manner,he said "It were infinite for the law to
consider the cause of causes,and the impulse one from another,
therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause;and
judgeth of acts by that without looking to any other decree."
The maxim was first employed by the courts as an autho--,
tive rule in cases of insurance. Gradually its use has increas-
ed, a: d now it is used in certain cases where common carriers
are parties,and in actions for negligence and :-reach of con-
tract,when it is sought to determine the defendants liability
for damages. On account of the different business and social
relations which exist between the plaintiff and defendant in
these different classes of cases,the line of reasoning which
3.
should be persued in attempting to determine the proximate
cause in a case which falls in any one of these divisions,
should be different than that used in either of the other two.
It is the purpose of this discussion to illustrate and set
forth as clearly as possible the meaning and application of
the maxim in these various branches of the law.
Application of the maxim.
A. In the law of Insurance.
Insurance is "a contract whereby for a stipulated considera-
tion,one party undertahes to indemnify the other against cer-
tain risks." Philips on Ins.§ 1.
When the contract is made the basis of a s'-)it
to recover for loss sustainedit must be shown that the loss
was the proximate cause of the peril insured againsti In Wat-
ers v.Ins.Co. 11 Peters 213,the court said 'We must interpret
this instrument according to the known principles of the com-
mon law.It was a well established principle of that law that
in all cases of loss we are to attribute it to the proximate
cause and not to any remote cause. "
Before proceeding further let us examine the
nature of the contract. It is a contract of indemnify made
in the interest of trade,and covering large amounts of prop-
erty. In interpreting it the words used,the intent of the
parties,and the public bearing of the questions are to be
taken into consideration. The courts should give the policy
a liberal construction. Robertson v.French,4 East,]35.
The policy is the evidence of the intention
of the parties. It names the perils insured against and the
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terms upon which the risks are assumed. If the partiei agree
that loss from certain perils are exceptedthe policy so s
states. From this it is evident that the intention of the
parties as expressed il the policy and blended with public
welfare, ought to be the ground upon which the courts should
base their argument when deciding whether or not the loss sued
for was caused proximately by peril insured against.
In some few instances the courts haveunfor-
tunately,fallen into the error of reasoning metp~hysically,
utterly disregarding the intent of the parties. Although the
logic used in deciding may have been faultless,yet the decis-
ions rendered have worked hardship because the intent of the
p.arties was not included in the premises.
In the case of Ins.Co.v. Sherwood,14 How.361,
the court said "It should not be forgotten,that .... the sci-
ence of insurance law has been made and kept a practical sys-
tem by avoiding subtile and refined reasbning,however logical
it may seem to be,and looking for safe and practical rules."
When a loss is occasioned by a peril mentioned
in the policy,but such peril being immediately connected or
caused by a peril not mentioned,or one bY expressterms ex-
cluded from the policythe question of proximate cause often
becomes a very difficult one. As has already been shown there
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-'ie certain principles which the court ought to take notice
of in arriving at a decision. One of the early cases, De Vaux
v. Salvador,4 Ad.& R.1.420,illust'ates the error into which
some of the courts have fallen.
In that case it appears that the master of
the Salvador had insured her against rerils of the sea. '1hile
pursuing her voyoge she collided with a steamship ,,iithout neg-
lige'ce on the part of either. The conflicting claims of dam-
ages were laid before an arbitrator at Calcutta.The arbitra-
tor decidedthat in accordance with the law of nations which
'was in force at that place,each should pay half of the joint
loss. The master of the Salvador brought suit against the
underwriters for the sum he was obliged to pay,claiming that
the collision,a peril of the sea,was the proximate cause of
the loss. The court held,however,that the law of Calcutta Wa.s
the proximate cause. Reasoning that theie had intervened be-
tween the collision and the loss for :ihich suit was brought,
an efficient anu independent causeto wit: the law of Calcutta,
and that therefore the collision was the remote cause.
This case has been expressly overruled and the
reasoning disapproved of,by the case of Peters v.Warehouse Ins.
Co.14 Peters,99. The facts vere similar to those of the case
just mentioned. The plaintiff insured the s'ip Paragon against
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perils of the sea. In sailing down the Elbe she collided with
d,, galliot, and the latter was sunk. The master of the galliot
libeled the Paragon,while the latter was lying at Hamburg. It
was decreedthat according to the law of Hamburg,the collis-
ion being without the fault of either,each should pay half of
the joint loss. The maste- of the Paragon brought suit against
the underwriters for the sum paid. The defendant argued that
the law of Hamburg was the proximate cause,citing De Vaux v.
Salvador. Story J.in the opinion said,"This is an over refine-
ment and savors more of physical than legal reasoning........
The law,as a practical science,does not indulge in any such
niceties. It seeks to administer justice according to a fair
interpretation of the parties;and deems that loss to be within
the rolicy which is a natural and necessary consequence of the
peril insured against. In a just view of the matter,the col-
lision was the sole proximate cause of the loss,and the de-
cree of the court did but ascertain and fix the amount of
charges upon the Paragon,anO attached thereto at the very
moment of the collision. The maxim causa non remota spectatur,
is not without limitation,and has never been applied in the
matter of insurance to the extent contended for,but that it
has been constantly qualified and constantly applied in modi-
fied practical sense,to the peril insured against."
8.
In Potter v.Ins.Co.3 Sumner,27. Story J. re-
marked that "In cases of this sort it will not do to refine 'o
much upon metphysical sublities. If a vessel is insured against
peril only,and is burned to the waters edge and fills writh
water and sinksit would be difficult in common sense to at-
tribute the loss to any other proximate cause than the fire,
and yet the water was the proximate cause of the submersion.
If a vessel is insured against barratry of the master and
crew and they fraudulently bore holes in the bottom and there-
b: she sinks,in one sense she sinks from filling in of water,
but in a just sense the proximate cause is the barratorious
boring of holes in the bottom."
In the case of the Ins. Co.v.Transp. Co.12 Wall.
194,it appeared that the plaintiffs had insured their vessel
against loss by fire. On her voyage a collision occurred,and
as a consequence a fire :ias started :thich caused the vessel to
sink. The court held that the fire was the proximate cause of
the loss. It was remarked by the judge writing the opinion,
that "Before any policy was issued,the transporters were the
insurers against collision and 1"ire,no matter how caused.
They sought protection against some of the probable conse-
quences of those risks,anu they obtained a policy insuring
them against all losses by fire,except fire cause. by certain
9.
things of which fire by collision was not one. Against every
other consequence of a collision than fire,they remained their
own insurers,but the ris" by fire was no longer theirs."
In Butler v.Wildman,3 B.& A.3YD. The facts
were substantially these; the owner of a vessel insured her
against loss by the enemy. On being attacked by the enemy,
the captain threw overboard a large iiuanity of Spanish dol-
lars to prevent their falling into the h-ands of the enemy.
Bailey J. said, "It was the duty of the master to prevent any-
thing which could strengthen the hands of the enemy from fall-
ing into their possession. Now as the money wo.Lld strengthen
the enemy,it was the duty of the master to throw it overboard.
.... I think the enemy was the proximate cause of the loss."
In P agoun v. Ins. Co.l Story,157,the court said,
"All the consequences naturally flowing from the peril insured
against,or incident thereto,are properly attributable to the
peril itself. If there is a capture,and before the vessel is
delivered from that peril,she is afterw.vards lost by fire,or
accident or negligence of the captors, I think it is clear
that the whole loss is properly attributable to the capture.
a
It would be an over refinement and metphysical sublity to
holL otherwise,and would shake the confidence of thn commer-
cial world in the supposed indemnity held out by policies
10.
against the common perils."
See Levie v.Janson 14 East 648.
Price v. H1omer 12 Mass.230.
Brown v. Ins. Co. 11 Johns.14.
The correct line of reasoning and in applying
the maxim is illustrated by cases where the property insured
is placed in such a position by negligence or barratry of the
master or crew,that it is acted upon by the peril insured
against. In those cases the peril insurecd against is the prox-
imate cause of the loss, unless injury caused by negligence or
oarratry of the master or crew is expressly excluLed by the
terms of the policy. In the latter case,the negligence or bar-
rat-y of the master or crew is the proximate cause of the
entire loss;otherwise no force would be given to the exception.
Ins.Co.v.Laurence 10 Peters 507.
Waters v.Ins.Co. 11 Peters 213.
In the opinion of the last case cited Story J.
remarked, "If we look at the question upon mere principle
without reference to any authority,it is difficalt to escape
from the conclusion,that a loss by a peril insurea against,
and occasioned by negligence is a loss within a marine policy
unless there be some other language in it ,hich repels that
conclusion. "
II.
The same genc- i principles which should gov-
ern the application of the maxim in marine insurance,should
be observed in fi-e insurance. A few illustrative cases will
be sufficient to show the use of the maxim in that branch.
When a fire occurs it is usually surrouided
by various elements,such as thievsbreakage in removin, gooc~s
to places of safety,exrlosionetc. Which aid in causing loss.
Whether or not a claim for loss occasioned by any of these can
be sustained against the insurance company,depenus upon con-
struction the courts put upon the policy. If it should appear
that the parties intended the policy to cover all such losses,
the fire is considered the proximate cause,and these elements
as simply incidents. But if,on the other hand,the courts find
that it was the intention of the parties to exclude damages
by these intervening causes,then the fire is the remote cause
of any damage that the excepted causes may have occasioned.
In .Thite v. Ins. Co.57 Me.91,the insurance com-
pany ras held liable for goods stolen during the progress of
the fire. In Ins.Co.v. Corlis 21 Wend.376,for loss caused by
the proper authorities blowing up a building to prevent fire;
and for man: other losses traceable directly to an accidental
fire,as injury from cinders or smoke. G Q.:3.N.C.319.
See Greenwald v. Ins. Co. 3 Phila.323.
12.
in case of removal of goods or destruction of
property to prevent further progress of the fire,there must
have been an apparent necessity for such action. The necessi-
ty need not be actual,but the acts should be such as an or-
dinarily prudent man wo'uTdd have authorized in view of all the
surrounding circumstances, White v.Ins. Co.57 ie.91. If such
necessity was apparent,the courts hold the fire ;vas the proxi-
mate cause. If there was no such necessity the fire :ias the
remote cause. The courts reason something like this; if there
was no real or apparent nece3sity for the action taken in a
common sense view of the matter a new cause has intervened
between the fire and the lossviz:the unwarranted action of
the person whose property is insured. But if the assured,or
person in authority had reasonable grounds fo ' the belief
that such action was necessary to save the property on account
of the proximity of the firelooking at the matter from a
practical point of view,the fire is the proximate cause and
the insurer is liable.
In the case of Everetts v.Ins.Co.19 C.B.120,
The facts were substantially as follows;a large powder maga-
zine situated in London exploded. The concussion caused great
destruction to buildings situated in the neighborhood.Among
those injured ras one owned by the plaintiff.The clause in
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his policy wias that the insurer "would only make good such
loss as was occasioned by fire." Earl C.J. said, "What was the
meaning of the parties under the contract?" He came to the
conclusion that the loss was not within the meaning of the
policy. In substance he stated that to hold otherwise,injury
occasioned to a building by an earthquake,which was usually
attributed to a subterranean fireor the shattering of window-
glass by the firing of artillery at a review,vwould be damage
by fire. Miller J. remarked, "In these insurance c,ses we are
bound to look to the immediate cause. In this instance it can-
not be siad that the loss was occasioned by fire,it was oc-
casioned by a concussion caused by fire,and we must therefore
go to the cause of causes before we arrive at the origin of
the loss,but this was not was intended by the parties."
The danger of arriving at a conclusion by
philosophical reasoning and then holding as a logical sequence
that such conclusion wias the intention of the parties,without
discussing the facts with regard to such intention,is illus-
trated by the case of Ins. Co.v.Tweed,7 Wall.44. The facts in
that case were these; an explosion occurred in a warehouse
situated directly across the street from one owned by the
plaintiff.A fire ensued which was communicated to the plain-
tiffs warehouse which was burned.The policy of the plaintiff
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excluded loss by explosion. The plaintiff brought suit on the
policy.Viller J.said, "The question is to ascertain whether
any new cause has intervened between the fact accomplished
and the alleged cause.If a new force 0:- power has intervened,
sifficient to stand the cause of the misfortunethe other
must be considered the remote. In the present case we think
there is no such new oause. The explosion undoubtedly produc-
ed and set in motion the fire which burned the plaintiffs
property. The fact that it was first carried to the warehouse
by burning another building supplies no new cause or force
which caused the burning. " He then said that this was in :<c-
cordance with the intention of the parties. Possibly it was
but I do not think that the learned justices line of reason-
ing to reac. such conclusion is entirely free from criticism.
It does not seem to me to be a logical statement to say,that
be cause in a physical sense the explosion was the approxi-
mate cause,therefore it was the proximate cause within the
91&M to
intention of the parties. There would be no ground for the
learned justices assuming, as he must have, that the parties
intended to have the contract interpreted from a physical
standpoint. It might have been that the parties only intended
to exclude loss by an explosion in the building;or tlat they
only intended to exclude loss caused by concussion,and yet
15.
include loss if ignqition followed in conasequence of such ex-
plosion. The line of reasoning used by the learned justice
will not admit the discussing of these questions.It mig t
easily have been that the burning of an intervening builiding
vrould have been considered a new cause within the intent of
the parties.In my opinion he ought to have first to have de-
cided,that it was the plain intention of the parties a3 ex-
pressed in the policy,to exclude all los-s caused by an explo-
sion if no new physical cause intervened. This,of course,viould
call into discussion the reneral intention of parties in in-
troducing such clauses.A decision arrived at by this method
would be much more likely to -ive voice to the true intention
of the parties,than the one used.
From this examination of the cases,it becomes
fully apparent that the application of the maxim in this
branch of the law ought to be a natural and practical one.As
was said by one of the judges,the maxim has been limited and
moulded by the courts so that expression ray be given to the
intention of the parties. As a rule persons making these con-
tracts do not take into consideration refined and subtile rea-
soning, and therefore the ) esS metaphiysical and the more prac-
tical the reasoning,the greater the justice that ,fill be ren-
dered to all persons concerned.
18.
B.In the law of common carriers.
We will now discuss the maxim as applied to the law of
common carriers.
A common carrier may be defined as one who,by
virtue of his calling,holus himself out to the public as a
transporter of goods for hire,for all those who choose to em-
.1
ploy him. ?YOf. t3Vt&LC.k(' L L* L .-6-v ltIl .S
By comnon law he is an insurer of all goods
placed in his possession for transportation. This liability
is founded upon public policy. It was contrived by the policy
of the law for the safety of all persons who,by the nature of
their affairs,were obliged to trust him. Coggs v.Bernard,2
Ld. Ray. 909.
The carrier is not,however,an insurer against
loss from all causes. If he can show that the loss or injury
was occasioned by the act of God,the public enemy,act of the
shipper or defect of the article itself ;he will be relieved
from responsibility. In order to have the first two defences
prevail he must show that they were the proximate and not the
remote cause of the loss.
New Brunswick v.Tiers 24 .J.L. 697.
Merchant v.N.Y.C.R.R.Co. 30 !T.Y. 5607.
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As has already been said the common carriers lia-
bility is founded upon public policy.With this fact in view
it is a natural and logical proposition, that is from the
standpoint of public welfare that the courts should view the
facts,when callec upon to determine whether ot not any of the
exceptions memtioned were the proximate cause of the loss.
Some of the courts,for some reason,have disregarded this un-
derlying principle and have reasoned from other points of
view when applying the maxim. As a consequence their decisions
h ave occasioned much confusion in this branch.
A line of cases in Pennsylvania and in MIass-
achusetts holding one way on a certain question,reasoning
from standpoints other than that of public policy;and the New
York Court of Appeals and the United States supreme court hold-
ing directly opposite, founding their decisions on the general
welfare of the public, illustrates the erroneous and correct
method of reasoning. The question involved in each case was
substantially,,whether in a case where goods having been rlac-
ed in the possession of a common carrier for transportation,
and by his negligence placed in such a position that they
were destroyed or damaged by act of God,the act of God or th,'
negligence should be considered the proximate cause of the
loss.
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The question first arose in the case of Mor-
rison v.Davis & Co.20 Pa.St.171. In that case it was shown
that the defendants canal boat containing the plaintiffs goods,
was recked at a certain point in the canal b., an extrordin-
iary flood;that if the defendant had not negligently started
out with a lame horse the boat would have passed the point in
safety before the flood occurred. The defendant argued,and
the court held that the act of God Jas the proximate cause of
the loss. The erroneous ground taken by the court will be
1-.own by quoting a single sentence. The court said, "They (the
carrier) are answierable for tho ordiniary and proximate con-
sequences of their negligence,and not for those that are re-
mote and extrordiniary. " The court here uses reasoning that is
proper in cases involving the negligence of an ordiniary per-
son and not that of a common carrier.
The M'assachsuetts courts followed this decis-
ion shortly afterwards in the case of Denny v.N.Y.C.R.R.Co.
13 Gray,481. In this case the defendant received plaintiffs
goods at Suspension Bridge to transport to Boston. The goods
were delayed at some place between Syracuse and Suspension
Bridge through the negligence of the defendant. While in Al-
bany they were damaged by an extrordiniary flood. Ilerrick J.
said, "The rise of the water in the Hudson which did the mis-
19.
chiefoccurred at a subsequent period and conse uently was the
dir-ect and proximate cause to which mischief is to be attribu-
ted. The negligence of the defendant was the remote; it had
ceased to operate as an activeefficient and prevailing cause
as soon as the wool had been carried beyond Syracuse,and can-
not therefore subjoct them to responsibility for any injury
to the plaintiffs property resulting from a subsequent inter-
vening accident,which 'Jas the proximate cause by which it was
produced. It is the latter only to which the loss sustained
by him is attributable.See Hoadley v.Transp.Coo 115 Mass.304.
Here again we find that the court says noth-
ing as to what application of the maxim public policy would
dictate. In the eye of a philosopher perhaps a new cause had
intervened between the negligence of the carrierbut had any
new cause intervened in the eye of rublic policy?
The New York courts and the United States su-
preme court have not followed these cases,but have rendered
decisions directly opposite~founding their reasoning on the
true basis public policy. They hold that in such cases the
negligence of the carrier is the proximate cause and the car-
rier is therefore liable.
In New York this rule was adopted by' the case
of Reed v.Spaulding,30 N.Y.330. Davy J.said, "If the goods
therefore had been forwarded from Mew York to Albany with
20.
reasonable diligence,and the injury had happened to them as
it did,by an act of Godthen the defendant would have been
excused and exempted from liability for the damage of the
goods so entrusted to iim.....The policy of the law is to hold
carriers to a strict liability and this policy for a wise and
just purpose ougrt not to be departed from....This principle..
is founded alike on good sense and good moral3."
The United States supreme court has apparentlI
followed the New York doctrine in the case of R.R.Co.v.Reeves,
10 Wall.173. This case has sometimes~as following the Pennsyl-
vania and Massachsuetts casesbut upon carefV2 examination it
o'Lld seemat leatas if there was nothing in the decision
rendered that is opposed to the New York rule. Goods belong-
in7, to the defendant in error were left in such a position by
the plaintiff in error,that they were destroyed by an extror-
diniary flood. The court held that the proper charge to the
jury was the one requested by the plaintiff in error,viz.
"Where the damages shown to have resulted from the immediate
act of Godsuch as sudden and extrordiniary flood,the carrier
waould be exempted from liability unless the plaintiff should
prove that the defendant ras guilty of some negligence in not
providing for the safety of the goods.That it could so do
must be shown by the plaintiff or must appear in the facts of
21.
the case." The meaning of this charge is made somewhat clearer
by a remark made by the judge in the case of Halliday v.Ken-
ard.
Ile said, "We do not mean to be understood as
laying down a different rule than the one which was laid dow-n
by this court in the late case of R.R.Co.v.Reeves namely,that
ordiniary diligence is all that is reqUired of the carrier to
avoid or remedy the effect of am overpowering cause."
The rule adopted by the New York courtsand
indicated by the United States Supreme Court is undoubtedly
the best. If the carrier wishes to excuse himself for any in-
jury to goods placed in his possession for transportation,
caused by an "overpowering cause",he must handle the goods
with ordiniary diligence. The rule works equitably and justly
with both parties,ana keeps the carrier from being negligent.,
Enough has been said to show that when the
question of proximate cause arises in connection with the law
of comon carriers,the maxim ought to be applied with an in-
tent to render a decision .hich will be the most beneficial
to public welfare, If the courts of Pennsylvamia anda Massach-
suetts had reasoned from the standpoint of public policy and
then arrived at the conclusion that the welfare of the public
would be in no way injured by holding that the negligence was
22.
the remote cause,their decisions would not be open to such
severe crtticism as they are.
It is clear that unless the development of the
law of comr~on carriers is founded upon the basis of public
policy,it will become a confused, conflicting and uncertain.
-As a consequence the welfare of the public will be greatly
inj ured.
23.
C. In actions for negligence and breach of contract.
In a general way the application of
the maxim in these two classes of cases is the same.In either
case the defendant is only liable for the natural and probable
consequences of his acts. In law the defendants acts are con-
sidered the proximate cause of such natural and probable re-
Sul t S.
As the reasoning used in applying the maxim
in a.r&tisb.$ fo breach of contract is so similar to that used in
actions ±or negligence,it will only be necessary to discuss
the latter.
When a suit for damages causeu by negligence
comes before the courts,they examine the facts for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether there exists between the aamage
complained of and the acts of the defendant a certain cansual
relation,to wit;that the damage was the natural and probable
consequence of the wrongful act. If there exists such a rela-
tion between the two,then the negligence is the proximate
cause of such loss and the defendant is liable.
In the case of Gerdhart v.Bates, ' Ell.&.B1.490.
Lord Campbell states the matter in this viay,he said "If the
wrong and the legal damage are not known to common experience
to be a usual sequenceand the damage does not according to
24.
the ordiniary course of even-ts ,follow from the wrong,the wrong
and the damage are not sufficiently con-joined or connected
as cause and effect to support an action." The same rule was
substantially laid down by Agnew J.in I'cGraw v.Stone,53 Pa.St.
436. "Tie are not" he said "to link together as cause and ef-
fect,events having no probable connection in the mind, and
which could not by prudent circumspection and ordiniary
thoughtfulness be foreseen as likely to happen in consequence
of the act in which ve are engagel. "
Yet it may be that the injury would not have
occurred had it not been for the negligence of the defendant.
But it would be manifestly unjust for a person to be compelled
to make good all possible loss that might under any circum-
stances result from his act,no matter how far removed. The
courts have decided that there must be the connection between
the two. already described. If there is not then the acts of
the defendant are the remote cause and therefore he is not
liable.
Let us not get an erroneous idea of the act-
ual relation that must exist between the two. It is not nec-
essary that the specific injury should have been actuall fore-
seen in order to have the negligence considered the proximate
cause. It need only be such as might easily have been antici-
pated. Higgins v.Dewey,107 Mass.494.
2u5.
Pollock C.R. in Rigby v.iiowit,remarked that"Every
person who Uoes a wrong is at leat responsible for all the
mischievous consequences that may have been reasonably antici-
pated to result under orainiary circumstances from such mis-
conduct. u
The term,reasonably to be expected,means such
consequences as would naturally and ordiniarily be expected
to follow in the long run. Smith v.Telegraph Co. 83 I.Y.ll5
Moulton v.Sanford,51 1'e.134,Sutton v.Wauwatosa,29 Wis.21.
In Grounlund v. Chapin,5 Ex.248, Pollock J.
said "I entertain considerable doubt whether a person who has
been guilty of negligence is responsible for all consequences
which arise,and in respect of mischief which couid by no pos-
sibikity have been foreseen,and which no reasonable person
would have anticipated. I am inclined to consider the rule of
law to be this,that a person is expected to anticipate and
guard against all reasonable consequences,but he is not by
the law of England, expected to anticipate and guard against
that which no reasonable person would have expected to occurf"
Much confusion has arisen on account of the
judges not distinguishing between the conditions and the
cause. Herein again the scientific and the legal investiga-
tors look at a given statement of facts from very different
20.
standpoints. To illustrate,suppose a carriage is being driven
down hill and a bolt breaks without negligence on the part of
the driver,and the horses are thereby detached from the car-
riage;as a consequence the wagon is precipitated over an em-
bakment which the road commissioners had negligently left
without a guard rail,and injury resjts. The scientist might
say that the result was the sum of all its antecedents,such
as the discovery of ironmaking of a carriage,breaking of the
bolt etc. , But in law the negligence of the road commission-
ers in not errecting a guard rail is the efficient and proxi-
mate cause. Palmer v.Andover,2 Cush.600. The discovery of
iron,breaking of the bolt or making of the carriage were sim-
ply conditions. Except so far as conditions are moulded by
the human will 16 bringing about injury,the law does not con-
cern itself about them. See City of Atchison v.King,9Kan. 550.
Salsbury v.lHerchenroder,106 Mass. 458.
From this brief discussion of the method pur-
sued by the courts in applying the maxim in suits for neglig-
ence and breach of contractit is clear that it is entirely
different from the methods that the courts should use in cases




The conclusion is necessarily a general one.The facts of a
case bein- ascertained by testimony,the maxim is applied for
the purpose of ascertaining the rights and liabilities of the
respective parties to the proceeding.Those facts alone are
viewed as cause and effect which have a direct bearing upon
those rights and liabilities. The question is sometimes,wheth-
er a cause is proximate to an effect,sometimes it is which of
several causes is immediate to an effect; sometimes the ques-
tion is whether an effect shall be referred to a certain cause
as its proximate resilt,sometimes it is to which of several
causes the e''ffect shall be referred. There are three divis-
ions into which cases involving one or more of these questions
falls. The method of applying the maxim in each division is of
a different nature from that employed in the others.
It is perhaps unfortunate that this division
has been made, but as has been shown it is a necessary one. If
all the courts would recognize these divisions and use the
line of reasoning applicable to each in applying the maxim,
the law in regard to this subject 1ould become much more set-
tled and uniform than it is at present.
A.., *
There is a strong tendency to cite authorities indiscrimin-
ately,seemingly not recognizing that cases in which thd rnaxim
has been applied,are of no value as authorities except in
that branch of the la,r which governed the reasoning in that
p--urticular case. It is apparent that as long as this practice
prevails,the law governing the application of the maxim .ill
be vaileL in obacurity,and in many cases great injustice will
be done. It is only by observing the various principles pre-
sented that the true legal application of the maxim can be
given.
